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Artifacts at the centre of routines:
performing the material
turn in routines theory
LUCIANA D’ADDERIO
The University of Edinburgh (UK) and the Advanced Institute of Management (AIM) Research
Abstract: Existing theories of organizational routines have generally had simplistic
and extreme views of artifacts as fully deterministic or largely inconsequential.
Artifacts have been treated as either too solid to be avoided, or too flexible to
have an effect. This paper endeavours to improve our understanding of the
influence of artifacts on routines dynamics by proposing a novel and deeper
conceptualization of their mutual relationship. In drawing from recent advances
in Routines and STS/Performativity Theory, the paper contributes to advancing
our understanding of routines dynamics by bringing artifacts and materiality from
the periphery to the very centre of routines and Routines Theory.
1. Introduction
Artifacts play key roles in routines (Nelson andWinter, 1982; Cohen et al., 1996;
Becker et al., 2005; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2005,
2008; D’Adderio, 2001, 2003, 2008a, b). They can influence their emergence
and persistence, both in destabilizing existing action patterns or providing the
glue that can hold patterns together; they can perform key functions, including
acting as mediators and intermediaries (Latour, 1987, 2005) among the agencies
involved in routinized performances, thus supporting or preventing coordination
among organizational communities and functions (D’Adderio, 2001; Carlile,
2002; Bechky, 2003); they can act as obligatory points of passage, thus enabling
or constraining worldviews and actions (Latour, 1987); and they can make
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explicit or hide actions and viewpoints, thus making connections between
practices and their outcomes more or less visible (Orlikowski, 2002; D’Adderio,
2001, 2008a).
Despite their importance, authors have only recently begun to explore the
influence of artifacts on routines evolution in a systematic way (Pentland and
Feldman, 2005, 2008; Cohen, 2007; Schultz, 2008; D’Adderio, 2008a, b). This
lack of attention might appear somewhat surprising when considering the key
role attributed to artifacts in the ‘first wave’ of routines contributions (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Cohen et al., 1996) where authors have focused on the role
of ‘external objects’ and ‘artifactual representations’ (including formal rules and
procedures) on routines. It is speculated here that the relative lack of interest in
artifacts in Routines Theory in recent years followed from the conscious effort
by authors to focus on the role of agency in shaping routines.
This focus seems entirely necessary when understood within the scholars’
efforts to convey the radical shift from thinking about routines as rigid, lifeless
entities to routines as generative systems (thus enacting what I call the first
‘Copernican revolution’ in Routines Theory). Artifacts – at first sight – appear to
be taking the routine towards the automatic/mindless end of the spectrum and
therefore do not appear immediately useful to a theory whose main objective
is to explain how routines are ‘brought to life’ (Cohen, 2007; Pentland and
Feldman, 2008). Agency breathes life into routines in a very immediate and
intuitive way. Agency, thus, had to be the focus of this ‘second wave’ of routines
studies that achieved so much progress towards a deeper characterization of
routines dynamics.
Within the evolutionary trajectory of the theoretical Routines debate,
however, we are now presented with a unique opportunity. Now that the
characterization of routines as generative systems (Pentland and Reuter, 1994;
Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2005) has been firmly
(and, hopefully, irreversibly) established, the time has come to take a next and, I
would argue, very necessary step forward. This entails performing a second ‘small
Copernican revolution’ in Routines Theory by bringing artifacts in general, and
artifactual representations of routines in particular, to the centre of routines
and to the forefront of the Routines debate. If the first radical shift in Routines
Theory, thus, was about emphasizing the role of agency in routines, the second
calls for a much deeper, stronger and nuanced characterization of the role of arti-
facts and materiality. A focus on how configurations of artifacts and people come
together and are stabilized in recurrent – but continuously challenged – patterns
of interaction can thus provide valuable insights into routines micro-dynamics.
Achieving those insights requires an improved understanding of the complex
ways in which artifacts may influence routinized performances. Enacting the shift
that brings artifacts at the centre of attention in Routines Theory, thus, involves
moving beyond extant partial renditions of artifacts to study them as multi-
faceted entities that can influence the course of routines, while at the same time
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themselves evolving as a consequence of their appropriation by certain agencies
in specific contexts. This entails moving beyond the dominant characterization of
artifacts as opaque, lifeless ‘objects’ that lie outside the routine. It also involves
moving past their extreme characterization as either fully prescriptive objects
that deterministically influence and constrain actions, or as simply descriptive,
infinitely malleable and often inconsequential entities, which depend upon the
agents’ willingness to include them as part of their performances.
To realize this objective, I will focus on a particularly significant category of
artifacts, including formal routines and rules and standard operating procedures
(SOPs) (Lazaric and Denis, 2001; D’Adderio, 2001, 2003, 2008a, b; Pentland
and Feldman, 2005, 2008). When compared with simpler artifacts, ‘artifactual
representations’ of routines – as models of actual routines – can provide
vantage points to observe the mutual influence of routines and artifacts. This
is because they are easier to observe, typically being written down or embedded
in technology (i.e. software, machines), and because they retain an imprint of the
agencies that have created and used them, thus helping reveal the deeper influence
of agency on routines. A focus on artifactual representations, I posit, will allow
us to make progress by revealing the complex dynamics of interactions between
routines and artifacts. Dynamics include the relationships between artifacts and
the ostensive, and artifacts and performances (Pentland and Feldman, 2005); as
well as between artifactual ‘representations’ of routines and actual ‘expressions’
(Cohen et al., 1996; D’Adderio, 2003, 2008a).
In this paper, I therefore argue for the need to bring artifacts to the centre
of the routine – and studies of artifacts to the centre of Routines Theory. This
shift is important in two ways: (1) theoretically, it focuses attention towards
the fundamental role that artifacts play in the production and reproduction of
routines, directly influencing the rate and direction of change in routines and
therefore their evolution, and (2) empirically, it reflects the key functions that
artifacts play in every-day routines performance. It is in fact difficult, if not
impossible, to envisage a routine that completes its course without involving any
artifacts at all. Talking about artifacts, moreover, does not imply abandoning
agency, as scholars in social studies of technology have shown (Orlikowski,
1992), but rather the opposite. By focusing on artifacts, I shall be able to show
how the combined influence of human agents and material artifacts shapes the
course of routines.
To fulfil the artifactual shift in Routines Theory requires some new theoretical
tools that enable us to focus on artifacts to uncover the complex interactions
between artifacts, human agency and routines. To this purpose, while building
on recent advances in Routines Theory, this paper introduces a new theoretical
framework which embraces the emergent narratives of Science and Technology
Studies (STS) and Performativity Theory. Drawing from examples of the
production and reproduction of routines in different manufacturing contexts,
this paper demonstrates how the Performativity framework can provide the
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key to unlock some of the complex dynamics of interactions between routines,
agencies, and artifacts.
2. The role of agency and artifacts in Routines Theory
What is an artifact?
I begin my analysis by reflecting on the role of artifacts in Routines Theory
and how, and to what extent, this has evolved over time. The word ‘artifact’,
or ‘artefact’, comes from the Latin words arte (ars, art) and factum (facere, to
make). Artifacts are defined as ‘anything made by human art and workmanship’
(Oxford English Dictionary Online), or ‘something created by humans usually
for a practical purpose’ (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 1990: 105).
There are probably as many characterizations of the nature, properties, and
role of artifacts as there are disciplines (see also Vilnai-Yavetz and Rafaeli, 2006).
For the purpose of this paper, I find it useful to distinguish among three main
perspectives: realist, constructivist, and actor-network theory (ANT).1 The realist
argument is that artifacts have stable, inherent properties so that agency can be
attributed to them straightforwardly. Realists, for example, have shown how the
physical structure or operation of artifacts, such as the design of a technology,
constrains or enables practices, beliefs, or social configurations (Mumford, 1964;
Winner, 1980). This view has been criticized by constructivists as it plays down
the role of social factors in defining an artifact’s properties. In contrast, the
social constructivist approach emphasizes how representations by different social
groups play a mediating role between the technology and its social context. The
changes in practices that follow the introduction/use of an artifact or technology
here depend upon the social representations of what the artifact/technology is and
what it does. Technologies, in other words, do not have objective properties: they
display ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Pinch and Bijker, 1987), and can be attributed
very different functions and properties depending on the agencies that use or
produce them. Absolute physical constraints in this framework do not exist, but
what appears to be a constraint is in reality a social construction, a particular
reading of the artifact that seems objective because it has become obdurate
through negotiation and closure (Pfaffenberger, 1992).
According to the ANT view, neither realists nor constructivists are able
to account for the complex interactions between people and things. Realists
underestimate the power of humans when faced with the intrinsic influence of
certain technologies, while constructivists underestimate the power of objects.
According to ANT scholars (Callon, 1987; Latour, 1987), the properties of
artifacts neither are objective facts, as in the realist tradition, nor are they mere
social constructions, as in the social constructivist tradition: artifacts and their
properties are both real and constructed. They emerge from a heterogeneous
1 See Brey (2005) for a deeper review of the literature than is possible here.
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network of social and technical elements (including social representations and
natural forces/technical elements) that co-construct them. Any phenomenon in
this framework is thus the outcome of the workings of heterogeneous socio-
technical ensembles of elements also referred to as ‘hybrid collectives’ (Callon
and Caliskan, 2010). Within such collectives, both humans and non-humans
(i.e. artifacts) can act, influence, and mediate (Latour, 1987). Thus, in this
view, an artifact’s properties are neither inherent nor socially constructed,
but relational and emergent: actants can form links with each other and this
can give rise to networks of actants. When the associations in a network
become stable or solidify, the network stabilizes. Properties emerge as black
boxes, as apparently objective properties of actants. In this paper, I hope to
demonstrate that this dynamic and emergent characterization of artifacts and
their properties can provide vantage points to study routines dynamics. First,
however, we need to delve deeper into the relationship between artifacts and
routines.
Routines and artifacts
A plethora of artifacts is typically involved in the course of a routine. These may
include letters, documents, clocks, calendars, meters, gauges, display boards,
forms and invoices (Nelson andWinter, 1982), spatial arrangements ofmachines,
tools and materials, and written codes of SOPs, or computer systems (Cohen
et al., 1996). While all kinds of artifacts can play instrumental roles in rule- and
routine-following, routines authors have traditionally placed an emphasis on
‘cognitive’ or ‘representational’ artifacts (Cohen et al., 1996). These include
SOPs and formal rules, often referred to as ‘artifactual representations’ of
routines (Hutchins and Hazelhurst, 1991; Cohen et al., 1996; Lazaric and Denis,
2001; D’Adderio, 2001, 2003, 2008a, b; Pentland and Feldman, 2005, 2008).
In Cohen et al. (1996), for example SOPs are defined as a kind of representation,
a formalized statement of what actions should occur. This separates SOPs from
the actions occurring as routines are expressed in context, a separation that is
desirable as ‘real behavior diverges substantially from formalized SOPs’ (Michael
Cohen in Cohen et al., 1996: 673). Thus, in this view, routines can be coded in
cognitive artifacts (representations) such as work-flow graphs, which facilitate
their manipulation, to be subsequently ‘brought back to the field’ generating
new expressions (actual routines). Written rules and procedures can serve as
proxies for the ostensive aspect of routines (Pentland and Feldman, 2005;
D’Adderio, 2008), or they can be read as embodying specific configurations
of views, goals, and dispositions by different agencies (D’Adderio, 2003, 2008a,
b). The relationship between SOP, rules, and ostensive can thus reveal the extent
of divergence, whereas the match between the SOP or rule and the actual routine
or performance can be understood as revealing the extent of control (Pentland
and Feldman, 2005). Increased control can be achieved by delegating the rule or
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procedure to machines or software, which tends to make them more persistent
and durable (D’Adderio, 2008 a, b; Pentland and Feldman, 2008).
Along the same line of thought, Rafaeli and Pratt (2006) have advocated
the need to study ‘linked artifacts’, such as written procedures and multiple
performances, which hold a special relationship as they evolve from one another
or are meant to replicate each other. Key issues highlighted here involve
understanding how multiple representations co-evolve, what is the relationship
between an actual routine and its ‘copy’, and the implications for performances
of introducing a tangible artifact that captures the routine. I will address these
key aspects later in the paper. At this stage, it will suffice to emphasize the
important role that formal procedures and rules play in routines reproduction.
In recognition of their key roles, rules and SOPs will be the main focus of the
rest of the paper.
When focusing upon the role of artifacts in Routines Theory I thus identify
three approaches: first, artifacts in early Routines Theory (Section 3 in this
paper); second, artifacts and agency (Section 4); and, third, artifacts at the centre
of the routine (Section 5). This journey will afford substantial progress towards
accomplishing the shift required to bring artifacts to the centre of routines.
3. Artifacts in early Routines Theory
Artifacts as ‘external memory’
Routines scholars have been concerned with the role of artifacts in routinized
performances from the outset. In early contributions, artifacts are part of,
and help constitute, the context that provides the background to routinized
performances. According to Winter (in Cohen et al., 1996), for example, context
dependence is a fundamental feature of routines, such that ‘their effectiveness
is not measured by what is achieved in principle but by what is achieved in
practice; this generally means that the routine might be declared effective in some
specific contexts, but perhaps not in others’ (p. 662). Winter (ibid.) highlights
two key aspects of context: physical, which is expressed in the local/artifactual
complements to the routine, including the material tools and physical plant
layout and equipment; andmotivational or relational, which captures the agents’
discretion to decide whether, when, and how to perform a routine.
These early contributions emphasize the role of artifacts as ‘external memory’
(Nelson and Winter, 1982); artifacts help humans deal with solving complex
problems by sharing some of the cognitive burden. This notion resonates with the
later anthropological notion of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995), pointing
to the fact that a routine does not reside in any one place, and certainly not
solely in the human mind, but is instead distributed across people and artifacts,
including rules and technologies. I will address these key notions later in the
paper. At this point, I want simply to highlight the fact that Routines scholars
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have pointed from the very outset to the complex and distributed web of artifacts
and coordinating relationships that constitutes and supports a routine (Winter,
1995, Szalanski, 1996).2 This bears important consequences for capturing the
nature of routines and the role of artifacts.
Artifactual ‘representations’ vs ‘expressions’
There is a further contribution in earlier Routines Theory, which also points to
the critical role of artifacts and has been similarly overlooked in subsequent work.
Early scholars have devoted specific attention to the key relationship between
formalized, or artifactual ‘representations’ of routines (including SOPs and
formal rules) and routines in practice, or ‘expressions’. Cohen et al. (1996), for
example, while agreeing that tacit knowledge and non-deliberate behaviour are
involved in the operation of routines, also highlight that stability and replicability
depend on ‘the following of explicitly stated rules and instructions . . . and
a carefully designed artifactual environment within which workers can learn
coordinated behaviors’ (Warglien in Cohen et al., 1996: 659). According to early
authors, thus, artifactual representations of routines – as ‘cognitive artifacts’,
which include rules and SOPs – play a central role in the evolution of routines,
including their transfer and replication. Transferring ‘best practice’, it follows,
rather than involving the straightforward uplift and transplantation of routines
to a new site, involves ‘a large effort to set up a “technology of replication” that
usually implies (i) learning a language within which to code successful routines,
(ii) creating cognitive artifacts that can be diffused (through flowcharts and other
replicable representations), (iii) translating the high-level description contained
in the cognitive artifact in actual practice, generating a new routine adapted to
the new context’ (Hutchins and Hazelhurst, 1991 in Cohen et al., 1996: 674).
Thus, in earlier routines work, procedures and rules as artifactual representations
of routines are key and intrinsic aspects of routines production and reproduction
(see also Schultz, 2008).
The discussion above shows that the exact nature and role of formal rules
and procedures (as representations), and the extent to which these artifacts are
able to shape the course of actual routines (expressions), were key topics in
early routines studies. Nevertheless, this pioneering discussion was limited to
identifying ‘interactions’ and ‘tensions’ between these two aspects of routines
and thus failed to make significant progress towards assessing their reciprocal
influence. To achieve this objective, we need more advanced and finer-grained
theoretical tools and methodologies.
2 The notion of a routine incorporating artefacts as well as relationships has been carried forward in
the routines transfer literature where scholars have highlighted the importance of reconstituting such a
web in the new context for the routine to remain operative (Szulanski, 1996; Winter and Szulanski, 2001;
D’Adderio, 2008b).
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4. Artifacts and agency
Artifacts are ‘not the routine’
The strong emphasis on artifacts found in earlier Routines literature was not
pursued in subsequent contributions with the exception of a rather narrow
stream of routines studies (see Becker et al., 2005; Pentland and Feldman,
2005, 2008; Cohen, 2007; Adler and Obstfeld, 2007; D’Adderio, 2001, 2003,
2008a). The relative lack of interest in artifacts must be understood as part of
the authors’ conscious effort to move away from a reductive view of routines as
‘things’ and bring agency back into the picture. This meant attributing artifactual
representations a lesser role when compared with actual routines (expressed in
context). Thus, the observation that ‘what finally generates value is the routine
(the expression) rather than the code (the representation)’ (Cohen et al., 1996:
674), while entirely accurate, underlies a representational view of routines that
implicitly relegates their artifactual representations to the lower rank of imperfect
imitations. The crux of the matter here is precisely what function can we ascribe
to a category of artifacts that plays such a crucial role in the evolution of routines.
On the one hand, it is important to reiterate that formal procedures, SOPs,
and rules are not the routine (Bourdieu, 1977; Cohen et al., 1996; Suchman,
1983; Pentland and Feldman, 2008; D’Adderio, 2008a). They are formal,
explicit, synthetic, selective, partial representations of routines (D’Adderio, 2003,
2008a). Distinguishing in this way between formal procedures and routines is
fundamental to avoid the categorical mistake of assuming that it is sufficient
to design a procedure to achieve a certain performance, as presumed in much
managerialist literature. Pentland and Feldman (2008), for example, havewarned
practitioners against ‘the folly of designing artifacts while hoping for patterns of
actions’ (p. 1). While practitioners all too often design artifacts in their attempt to
control and prescribe routines, they are committing the clearmistake of confusing
artifacts with the routine’s ‘ostensive’ (abstract) aspect (ibid.: xx).
At best artifacts can be ‘partial representations’ containing selected
and codified configurations of the multiple (ostensive) views and physical
arrangements that make up a routine (D’Adderio, 2008a). Moreover, while
such artifacts are designed for the very purpose of directing performances, the
actor’s complicity in following their course is often required. SOPs, thus, rarely
prescribe work, as actors are often able tomodify them, or even altogether neglect
to include them in their performances. Thus, in Suchman’s case (1983), office
routines differ from their representations. In Feldman’s example (2000), routines
are not incorporated into performances; the workflow and freeze processes fail
to fully prescribe the routine in D’Adderio (2003, 2008a respectively); and in
Lazaric and Denis (2001), SOPs fail to determine actions.
On the other hand, while this distinction is important, there is more to
it. Even though artifacts very rarely coincide precisely with the routine, they
nonetheless still play a key role in their evolution. It is precisely for this
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Figure 1. Reciprocal influence of procedures and performances
Source: D’Adderio (2008).
reason that artifacts, in general, and artifactual representations, in particular,
deserve further investigation. For example, addressing the relationship between
representations (routines-in-theory) and expressions (routines-in-practice) in
depth and in detail can provide vantage points to characterize the evolution of
routines (D’Adderio, 2003). This includes uncovering the processes of translation
from formal routines to actual performances and vice-versa, from performances
back to procedures, or, in other words, the co-production of procedures and
performances (D’Adderio, 2001). By adopting the notion of translation, a term
dear to the Sociology of Technology, I intend to emphasize the fact that the
movement from formal procedures to performances, and vice-versa, entails
not so much a straightforward process of codification and de-codification (of
performances into procedures and vice-versa) but one of deep transformation,
of socio-technical ‘actualization’ and ‘virtualization’ involving both actors and
artifacts (as in the notion of ‘translation routines’ in ibid).
Building on this line of thought, more recent work by D’Adderio has
further theorized the mutual influence of procedures (routines-in-theory) and
performances (routines-in-practice) in the cases of the engineering freeze process
(2008a) and of the exact replication of routines (2008b) both in high-technology
manufacturing contexts. Drawing from Performativity Theory, the first study
examines the introduction of software-embedded SOPs in the Engineering Freeze
process and shows how (computer-embedded) procedures and rules play a
fundamental influence in shaping performances: formal routines are dynamically
performed through iterative cycles of framing, by which there is convergence
between model and reality, overflowing (by which there is divergence between
model and reality) and further reframing (D’Adderio, 2008a,b) (Figure 1).
The second case study builds on these findings to capture the key role of
artifacts, or SOPs, as intermediaries and mediators in the transfer of a production
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Figure 2. Relationship between procedures and performances in artifact-mediated
routines transfer
Source: D’Adderio (2008b).
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capability and associated routines in manufacturing. This work characterizes the
deeper mechanisms by which procedures influence performances at both origin
and destination sites (D’Adderio, 2008b) and shows how similarity between
origin and destination is the emergent outcome of iterative cycles by which the
formal, computer-embedded, procedures are performed at both sites (Figure 2).
These examples demonstrate clearly that, in order to achieve further insights into
routines dynamics, we need to go beyond a passive view of procedural artifacts
to analyse their complex and active role in the production and reproduction
of routines. This role entails enrolling a plethora of other artifacts (including
objects, tools, and technologies) that make their reproduction possible, or
even likely. Understanding routines, in other words, involves taking artifacts
seriously.
Artifacts and routines: dead or alive?
In order to advance our understanding of the role of artifacts in routines’
change and stability, we need therefore to turn our attention to the character
of artifactual representations and the socio-technical mechanisms that regulate
their evolution. Michael Cohen’s (2007) distinction between ‘dead’ and ‘live’
routines, inspired by Dewey’s influential theory (1922), is highly relevant here.
While ‘dead routines’ tend to be rigid, mindless, and are typically codified
in artifacts, tools, and technologies, ‘live routines’ are flexible, mindful, and
involve the contribution of actors, their experience and learning. The distinction
between live and dead routines delivers a powerful message about the nature
of routines and the role of agency in routines, which has been lacking in
earlier routines literature. While this analytical distinction is useful, however, it
requires further qualification when it comes to characterizing the role of artifacts.
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In particular, I suggest that these notions must be treated with care to ensure that
the connotation ‘dead’, when attributed to a routine, does not result in obscuring
the nature and role of artifactual representations of routines and their own
internal mechanisms (dead meaning not so much inconsequential, but hardened,
solidified). After all, there are entire bodies of scholarly knowledge that draw
from ‘dead artifacts’ to inform the way in which we understand and characterize
organizations, cultures, and societies. Anthropologists and archaeologists, in
particular, are able to reconstruct entire societies from their scattered, partial
remains and vestiges. From anthropology, thus, we learn that human agencies
leave traces of their knowledge and work in artifacts (Thomas, 1991). Another
way to express this is to say that artifacts are front-loaded with the habits,
intentions, and rationales held by the agencies by which they have been created,
adopted, and adapted.
When extending this thinking to routines, we can see how previous experience
and learning by organizational agencies are selected and codified into formal
routines and procedures. So-called ‘best practices’3, for example, originate from
assumptions that come from sectoral and industrial experience, as well as the
knowledge of analysts, regulators, and policy-makers. When they are embedded
in artifacts, such as software packages, they also come to incorporate the
knowledge, learning, and experience of software users and producers. In this
process, layers of rationales, assumptions, and experience become over-imposed
in artifacts (D’Adderio, 2003 and 2008b). In D’Adderio (2008b), for example,
we can see how configurations of rationales embedded in the central computer
model reflect the outcome of performative struggles in which the artifact has
been involved.
The immediate implication of this argument for the adoption of standard
practices is that rationales delegated to artifacts inevitably interact (meaning
that they may either complement or conflict) with the intentions and rationales
of the locale where the procedure is used/adopted, as further discussed below.
These routines may certainly be dead, but they nevertheless retain traces of
previous lives, and, because of this, they are worthy of study and attention. It is
in fact their very nature, their relative stability when compared with the variation
that is present in performances, and their relative solidity when compared with
abstract (ostensive) views that makes them ideal loci for study. Formal routines
and procedures, in being often codified and embedded in material artifacts, are
relatively stable and easy to observe, and can thus provide invaluable empirical
vantage points to explore routines dynamics. Ultimately, artifacts are only part
of what makes up the routine; nevertheless, they do play a key role that scholars
have only just begun to explore.
3 I use the term ‘best practice’ in brackets in adherence to the well-established critique to the linear,
managerialist interpretation of the transfer and reproduction of practices/routines as straightforward
diffusion (see Szulanski, 1996; Winter and Szulanski, 2001 for a state-of-the-art critique).
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5. Artifacts at the centre of routines
I thus propose that enacting the shift that brings artifacts from the periphery
to the centre of routines entails performing four key steps, which I address
in the remaining part of the paper. First, I begin by highlighting the key role
of artifacts through emphasizing the distributed nature of routine- and rule-
following. Second, by introducing the notion of inscription, I show how artifacts,
far from being passive and opaque black boxes, can perform the role of actants
in routinized performances alongside human actors. Third, once it is established
that artifacts can actively shape the course of routines, I analyse the ways and
degrees by which artifacts can influence performances. And, fourth, I place
artifacts at the centre of routines by discussing how artifacts and routines co-
evolve through being involved in performative struggles among conflicting and
complementary organizational agencies.
Highlighting the key role of artifacts: routine-following is distributed
The first step in our quest to place artifacts at the centre of routines involves
acknowledging the important role that they play in routine-following. Routinized
performances typically involve not only humans, the focus of much mainstream
routines literature, but also non-humans. The key role that non-humans play in
the performance and evolution of routines can be usefully captured through the
notion of distributed action/cognition (Hutchins, 1991, 1995).
Rooted in Cognitive Science (Hutchins, 1991, 1995; Hutchins andHazelhurst,
1991), the notions of distributed knowledge and action address the fact that
there is more to cognition than what takes place in human minds. By describing
processes in terms of functional relationships between brains, other people,
and external objects, for example, Cognitive Science places an emphasis on the
role of contextual elements in shaping individual and collaborative action and
cognition. The role of artifacts as mediators is thus brought to the fore. Artifacts
in this framework not only include man-made objects but also representational
forms (i.e. spoken language, graphical models, text, etc.) which help propagate
information in the material and social environment. Special attention is thus
devoted to ‘cognitive artifacts’, tools developed for enhancing or facilitating
human cognition whose close observation can provide valuable insights into
the meaningful, constantly evolving practices that specific cultures produce and
reproduce (Hutchins, 1995).
Cognitive artifacts are ‘objects’ made by humans for the purpose of aiding,
enhancing, or improving cognition. Scholars have included in this category a
range of artifacts including not only forms, flowcharts, worksheets, schedules,
and graphs (Hutchins, 1995; Hutchins and Hazelhurst, 1991) but also rules of
thumb, proverbs, mnemonics, and memorized procedures, which play a similar
role to objects in some cognitive processes (Norman, 1993). Early work in Actor
Network Theory (Latour, 1987) has shown how the distribution of cognitive
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activity within socio-technical networks and between people and inscriptions
accounted for much of the work of science. According to Latour, non-linguistic
inscriptions or representations such as maps, charts, graphs, and tables enable
the superimposition of representations of otherwise incommensurable items
(1986). The physical and material arrangement of artifacts themselves has
also been referred to as a cognitive artifact, including the arrangement of
tools and machines on a factory floor (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen
et al., 1996; Pentland and Feldman, 2005). A variety of artifacts including
diagrams, checklists, forms, SOPs, rules, and procedures, some of which may
be subsequently embedded in a software artifact, are often devised by managers
to design or redesign a work process (Pentland and Feldman, 2005, 2008).
Similarly, ‘intellectual’ or ‘conceptual’ equipment, including models, equations,
and calculators, are described as fundamental in sustaining the performance of
practices in financial markets (MacKenzie, 2009).
The notion of distributed cognition is not entirely new to Organizational
Theory. According to Simon (1969) and Arthur (1994), agents faced with
complicated tasks conceive of tools, create rules and routines or set up
organizations to relieve their brains and enhance their performance. In so doing,
these authors have extended the actors’ cognitive capacities by ‘redistributing
their brains, at least implicitly’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2005: 1237, emphasis
added). In early Routines Theory, analogously, the notion of distributed
knowledge has provided ‘the natural locus of attention for lines of research
focused on the role of artifacts’ (Cohen et al., 1996: 683).
The implications of treating routinized activity as distributed, however,
have not been fully acknowledged in extant Routines Theory. To further our
understanding, we thus need to turn to the work of researchers in Science
and Technology Studies, especially that based on Actor-Network Theory.
According to STS scholars, knowledge and actions are rarely individual; they
mobilize entities, humans, and non-humans, which participate in the creation
of knowledge or the performance of actions. This holds important implications
for routine and rule-following: participation in (routinized) performances by
artifacts is not quite as passive as more or less explicitly assumed in earlier theory
and can only exceptionally be reduced to its purely instrumental dimension.
According to Callon and Muniesa (2005), thus, the notion of distributed
cognition leads us away from standard theories of action, which reserve agency
for humans alone, towards the notion of distributed agency. Actor Network
Theory (ANT) scholar Bruno Latour, for example, shows how calculative
agencies are not human individuals but ‘collective hybrids’ (1987, see also Callon
and Caliskan, 2010). Latour argues that calculation does not take place solely in
the confines of the humanmind, but is distributed among humans (equipped with
instruments) and non-humans. Analogously, for Callon and Muniesa (2005)
agencies’ calculative capacities are not stand-alone but linked to distributed
equipment. Distributed equipment includes bodies, tools, and machines
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(i.e. the broker’s ear in MacKenzie, 2009; the stock ticker in Preda, 2007;
trading screens in Knorr Cetina, 2005) as well as models, theories, equations,
rules, and procedures (MacKenzie, 2009). Routine and rule-following are, in
other words, truly distributed and material processes (Hatherly et al., 2007;
D’Adderio, 2008a; MacKenzie, 2009).
A crucial consequence of treating cognition and action, including rule-
following, as distributed, I propose, is acknowledging the fact that knowledge
and action are not simply ‘distributed between’ but ‘stretched across’ actors
and artifacts. This subtle but key distinction has often been overlooked by
organizational scholars. These have traditionally taken a simpler interpretation
of distributed cognition, merely as external source or repository of information
or technology from which actors can arbitrarily draw during the course of
their activities. The fact that cognition is distributed, however, bears deeper
meaning as well as holding important consequences. The notion suggests that
the actor’s knowledge, skills, and competences depend on – and are at the
same time configured by – the tools and artifacts they encounter or involve
into their routinized performances. In other words, the skills and capabilities
of actors are mediated and fundamentally transformed by the capabilities of
the tools and instruments that they use in their work (Latour, 2005). The
notion of ‘distribution’ therefore holds implications for routines far beyond
those commonly ascribed in the literature.
This distinction is evident in Hutchins’ example of navigation where he
showed how the process of piloting a ship in and out of a harbour is a complex,
rule-determined activity involving not only the coordination of crew members,
but also the use of navigational instruments and maps (1995). A gyrocompass,
for example, incorporates some essential rules of sea and land orientation and,
for this reason, it requires that the pilots’ skills and activities be adjusted
to its properties (Hutchins, 1991). Similarly, in his ethnography of the two
different scientific practices of ‘opticism’ and ‘digitality’, Lynch (1992) showed
how rule- and routine-following depend on the complex relationships between
material devices, theoretical optics, geometry, and modes of graphic represen-
tation.
Along the same lines, this author (D’Adderio, 2001) showed how the Virtual
Prototype did much more than embody the information and codified knowledge
required to design and produce a new vehicle: it allowed for departments and
functions across the extended organization (including suppliers and customers)
to access development data in real time and feed back their knowledge and
expertise into the shared virtual model. The Model also supported new practices
and forms of calculation for product design and engineering which involved
iterative cycles of ‘translations’. Through these translations some of the local
knowledge held by local practitioner experts could be incorporated into the
Model (virtualization, i.e. by using digital scanning techniques), and the global
digital knowledge embedded into the Model could be used to produce local
versions of the product (actualization, i.e. by using advanced CAD-printing
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techniques).4 Translations involved conversions from the ‘language’ of local
functions and experts (Galison, 1999), present in multiple and divergent local
formats, to the Model’s ‘language’, ordered according to the software format,
and back to the local language(s). While the software-embedded prototype did
not contain all knowledge used or produced by the different functions involved,
it nonetheless afforded new flexible ways to share data and learn about the
product (ibid.).
Further examples can be found in more recent literatures. Preda (2004),
for example, shows how by altering the equipment of traders through the
introduction of the stock ticker, new ways of calculating decisions in financial
markets could be afforded. In allowing prices to be known in real time and
distant places, the ticker favoured new forms of arbitrage and speculation. For
example, the availability of prices through displays allowed the development of
techniques of graphic analysis of price variations such as chartism. Similarly, to
the case of the Virtual Product in D’Adderio (2001), the ticker did more than
provide information, it constructed data that, owing to their format, produced
specific effects of cognition and action Callon and Caliskan (2010). A similar
argument is raised by Beunza and Stark (2004) in their study of the trading
room of a modern investment bank. Here heterogeneous forms of calculation
were produced that depended on the devices used by traders to distribute their
calculative activities (including trading robots, telephones, pricing tools, etc.).
The examples above illustrate how understanding routine- and rule-following
as cases of distributed cognition can hold important implications for how we
characterize artifacts. Artifacts in this light acquire a new role, one that goes
beyond the passive intermediary role attributed to them inOrganizational Theory
to the role of mediators that participate in the co-creation of knowledge and
transformation of actions (Latour, 2005).
Artifacts as actants: the role of ‘inscriptions’
Analysing the role of artifacts as mediators entails moving beyond a
characterization of artifacts as opaque, monolithic objects to account for the
dynamics by which they are produced and reproduced as they become involved in
routinized performances. In turn, this will provide valuable means to understand
how artifacts influence those performances in which they are engaged. An
important conceptual device to guide our exploration in such an uncharted
territory, is to study artifacts in general, and the artifactual (coded or de-
contextualized) routine, in particular, as ‘inscriptions’.
Authors in the Science and Technology Studies (STS) tradition have shown
how a complex range of rules and assumptions are embedded as ‘scripts’ within
artifacts and technology during the design and usage stages (Barley, 1986;
4 I named these iterative practices of virtualization and actualization ‘translation routines’ as they are
recurrent patterns of interactions that allow for the translation of knowledge, activities, and expertise,
from the level of local functions to the level of the digital, shared model.
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Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1992; Grint andWoolgar, 1992). Creating scripts involves
the socio-technical process of ‘inscription’ (Latour, 1992) by which dominant
interests or ‘programs for action’ are reflected in the form and functioning of a
technology. Inscriptions are ways in which specific functions can be delegated to
artifacts and technologies. Latour’s hydraulic door closer, for example, absorbs
the energy of those who open the door, retains it, and then releases it slowly in
a manner similar to what one could expect from a well-trained butler (Latour,
1992). While this does not imply that the assumptions that designers and users
embody in technological artifacts are prescriptive (Latour, 1987), it does point
to the influence of scripts and their configurations on future performances that
involve that particular technology or artifact. The notion of inscription thus
can provide important ways to advance our characterization of artifacts and
technologies as mediators that perform or influence the practices in which they
are involved and the contexts in which they are embedded.
While useful for understanding artifacts in general, the notion of inscription
can be especially valuable to characterize the influence of artifactual
representations (i.e. formal procedures, SOPs, rules) on routines. Formal routines
as inscriptions have some key characteristics. First, they are not neutral (Barley,
1986; Akrich, 1992; Bakken and Hernes, 2006; Preda, 2007; D’Adderio, 2003,
2008a) but instead reflect the objectives, motivations, values, and dispositions
of the agencies that use/produce them as well as the context from which they are
abstracted. Second, they are selective, implying that the knowledge they contain
has been sifted, ordered, and classified according to one or more rationales or
‘logics’ (Bowker and Star, 1999; D’Adderio, 2003). In D’Adderio (2008a), for
example, the software-embedded SOP embodies the Design Engineers’ view of
the world (expressed in their classification of the product structure according to
vertical, parent–child relationships), which clashes with Production Engineers’
view of the world (expressed in their classification of the product structure
according to horizontal, Boolean algebraic statements). Accounting for the role
of technology- and artifact-embedded rules as inscriptions implies that focusing
solely on actions by human agents to explain rule- and routine-following practice
would leave us short of an explanation.
The idea that routines, and their artifactual representations, embody
contrasting views, intentions, or logics that belong to various agencies is not
totally removed from early assumptions in Organizational Theory, whereby
authors have defined SOPs as the outcome of locally solved conflicts of interests
(March and Simon, 1958; Nelson andWinter, 1982): SOPs embody social norms
and worldviews that belong to the agencies that have created/adopted them and
‘because of the reallocative effects involved in the change of rules any change
would re-create new internal conflicts that could not be easily solved’ (Cohen
et al., 1996: 694). The crucial implications of this notion for understanding
routine-following, however, have not yet been fully explored in Routines Theory.
This is where STS studies become especially useful.
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From STS scholars, for example, we learn that, as long as the script finds no
problem, the program for action that is expressed in the script is not opposed.
When questioned, however, the script becomes visible and anti-programs can
develop whereby users attempt to react to the assumptions embedded in the
technology (Latour, 1987). The implications of this are particularly relevant to
routines transfer and replication: what happens, for example, when procedures
loaded with embedded rationales that reflect a truce in a specific context are
transferred to a new context? What kinds of conflicts are likely to arise as
embedded rules and norms that belong to a previous context are performed in a
new context, characterized by different rules and understandings? And what are
the implications of this for the evolution of routines and their artifactual repre-
sentations in the new context? In a study of the transfer of a complex capability
and associated routines across two units of a global manufacturing enterprise, for
example, this author has shown how selected assumptions and (ostensive) views
that belong to the origin site are embedded in the shared ComputerModel, which
contains a codified version of all routines that make up the capability (D’Adderio,
2008b). The assumptions embedded in the SOPs and Model is subsequently
performed at a destination where they shape local performances. The study
also shows how the Model and associated procedures themselves change as a
consequence of being performed at the destination. Deeper understandings of
the role of artifacts can open up new avenues for routines research.
To make further progress in this promising direction, however, we need a
theory that is able to analyse artifacts and chart the specific arrangements of
knowledge, views, assumptions, and motivations that have produced them. In
the case of artifactual representations, such a theory should allow us to capture
the micro dynamics by which formal routines as inscriptions are brought to life
(Cohen, 2007; Pentland and Feldman, 2008; D’Adderio, 2008a) in a new setting,
or in other words how they perform the new setting. In addition, our approach
should allow us to capture the dynamics by which artifactual routines come
into being, or are created by abstraction from an existing setting. Such a theory
can enable us to capture how specific (ostensive) views and rationales come to
be embedded in artifacts (and artifactual representations of routines), and the
subsequent effect that artifacts, containing a specific configuration of scripts, have
on performances (D’Adderio, 2008b). Applying the notion of script to routines,
in other words, allows us to ‘situate the ostensive’ aspect by acknowledging
that views and objectives do not simply reside in the actors’ minds but are
also embedded in – or delegated to – artifacts. Taking the notion of scripts
seriously implies recognizing that agency can be embedded in artifacts, both as
traces of actions (as in a step-by-step instructions procedure) and of intentions,
assumptions, rationales, and logics, and that this will have crucial implications
for routines evolution. Before we can achieve a new theorization, however, a
further step is required, one that allows us to capture the ways and degrees in
which artifacts can influence routinized performances.
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The influence of artifacts on routines: constraints, affordances
and the ‘power of default’
The third step towards taking artifacts seriously entails analysing more closely
the role and influence of artifacts, tools, and technologies on routines. This
involves going beyond the current characterization of artifacts as simply ‘guiding’
and ‘constraining’. According to Callon and Muniesa (2005), for example, the
artifact does not simply offer passive guidance: it offers an invitation. This notion,
similar to the notion of affordance (Gibson, 1979), implies that the artifact,
simply by being there, and available, proposes a specific kind of ‘calculation’ to
the actor, whomay accept (or not) the ‘invitation’ and ask the tool to perform the
calculation (ibid.). The agencies’ calculative capacities are thus linked in complex
ways to their equipment, which is distributed. The shift in emphasis towards a
more active role for artifacts bears important consequences for routines. Far
from implying that artifacts, including rules or procedures, determine action,
or the course of a routine in our case, this concept suggests a richer and more
meaningful role for artifacts than that currently allowed in the literature.
The dominant way in which we understand the influence of artifacts and
technologies in Social Science can be traced back to Wittgenstein. Drawing from
his work, early social constructivists and ethnomethodologists, for example,
have highlighted how (technology-embedded) rules and classifications are never
deterministic but always interpreted (Garfinkel, 1967; Barnes, 1982; Bloor, 1997;
Hatherly et al., 2007; Lynch, 1992). In their view, and in accordance with one of
Wittgenstein’s prevailing interpretations, the irreducible interpretive flexibility
of rules is such that – at least in theory – it can lead to infinite regression as ‘no
course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule’ (Wittgenstein, 1967: 81). Due to the
logical under-determination of behaviour by rules, there can be no closure as
‘The rule is, at any given time, what the practice has made it’ (Taylor, 1993:
57–8, emphasis in original).
Organizational scholars belonging to the stream of Structuration Theory, have
drawn on these approaches in conceptualizing the role that technology plays as
a source of constraint and enabler in rule-following (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski,
1992). According to Orlikowski (1992), for example, technology constrains
performance by facilitating it in a particular manner. A telephone, computer,
hammer, or pencil can thus facilitate the performance of certain kinds of work
and not others. The emphasis in these literatures however is firmly on human
practices and the discretion of human agents to follow a procedure or rule or to
choose to do otherwise (Giddens, 1993; Orlikowski, 1992). According to this
framework, the properties embedded inside artifacts are never predetermined
but rather ‘the capacity to modify the ‘rule’ that is drawn on in any action is an
ever present possibility’ (Cassell, 1993 in Orlikowski, 2000: 411). Similarly, in
his study of the introduction of CT scanners into two different hospitals, Barley
(1986) showed how, while technologies do influence organizational structures,
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their influence depends on the context in which they are embedded. At the
extreme, rules in this view exist only ‘virtually’ and are consequential only to the
extent that they are enacted by users through practice.
While crucial in dispelling technological determinism, this view contains a
somewhat partial characterization of the role of artifacts. While in fact, in
rule-following as well as in other realms of human practice, artifacts do not
determine actions, they nevertheless play an important role (Hatherly et al.,
2007). Technical systems, for example, make it possible or easy to do certain
things, and impossible to do others, so that, while in theory there can be infinite
regression, ‘the logical open-endedness of the application of terms to particulars
and the logical under-determination of behaviour by rules are foreclosed in
practice’ (ibid.: 11: emphasis added). In other words, once embedded in artifacts,
skills and tacit knowledge (Latour, 1992), rules (Hutchins, 1991; Preda, 2000),
and procedures (D’Adderio, 2003; Hatherly et al., 2007) tend to become
more stable and durable, and this holds radical implications for rule-following
behaviour. So while, in theory, actors can always choose to reject a tool or a
rule, or decide to abide by it ceremoniously, in practice actors often follow the
path of least resistance (MacKenzie, 2006).
This principle can be illustrated by analysing a category of technological
artifacts, and is both interesting and relevant: software. Information systems, as
bundles of inscriptions, play a fundamental role in influencing rule-following.
Such systems are ‘neithermerely neutral media nor simplymeans of increasing the
efficiency of what unaided human beings might do’ (Hatherly et al., 2007: 32).
They structure work, extend interactions, increase visibility of knowledge and
actions, create a common platform for the accumulation of common knowledge,
constrain the ability of practitioners to alter the results of another, regulate who
has access to making changes, track the progress of changes, link multiple sites in
different time/geographical locations, facilitate data sharing and the reception of
feedback (Orlikowski, 2002). They solidify and stabilize rules, procedures, and
classifications thus making it more difficult to avert them (Hatherly et al., 2007).
Clearly, on the one hand, technical constraint is never absolute, and indeed
many systems’ controls can be subverted if sufficient resources and incentives
are applied to the task. On the other hand, however, there are reasons why the
influence of technologies – in general – and information systems – in particular –
is critical. While in theory it is always possible to bypass software-embedded
controls, in practice this does not occur very often (D’Adderio, 2003, 2008a).
A first reason is that the assumptions, rules, procedures, and classifications
embedded in software, both at design and usage stages, tend to become part
of the users’ habitual background (Bourdieu, 1977), or ‘the way we do things
around here’ and as such often go unquestioned. Secondly, as distributed and
pervasive technologies, information systems are often entangled into a thick
web of organizational relationships which make them difficult to avoid. Once
adopted, for example, software can influence what kind of information should
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be created, selected, and shared, with whom, in which format and in what
sequence. What is important here is that, while practitioners can choose to
bypass the software, their boycott will hold consequences for them in terms of
their ability to have their work taken into account by others in the organization.
Thirdly, software tends tomake information more visible across an organization
thus making it easier to control that actions actually comply with the software.
Fourthly and finally, while formal software controls can – in theory – be easily
modified or entirely averted, in practice this requires the deployment of resources
(i.e. time and software programming skills), which are often unavailable. In these
circumstances, the ‘power of default’ of such artifacts (Koch, 1998 in D’Adderio,
2003; Pollock and Cornford, 2004) will prevent adaptation and customization.
An appreciation of the multiple ways and varying degrees to which artifacts
and technological systems can influence routines and rule-following calls for the
need to bring this analysis to the forefront of Routines Theory. This step involves
careful consideration of artifacts and their embedded assumptions and dynamics
in order to begin to understand their deeper implications for routines.
Routines and artifacts: degrees of influence
A deeper characterization of the relationship between routines and artifacts
entails moving beyond extremes to study the dynamics that regulate their
mutual influence. To achieve this goal we need a finer-grained framework
that is able to capture the influence of artifactual representations (routines in
theory) on performances (routines in context) that goes beyond the extremes of
prescription (full influence) and description (no influence). Some recent advances
in Performativity Theory, and their even more recent application to Routines
Theory, can provide a new characterization. According to Performativity
scholars (Callon, 1998; Callon andMuniesa, 2005), while the two extreme cases,
one where the tool or artifact is instrumentalized and the other where the actor is
instrumentalized, are always possibilities, performativity, which involves some
kind of reciprocal adaptation under conditions of uncertainty, is more often
the norm. This is especially true when an artifact is entangled within a thick
web of organizational relationships, as the earlier example of software illustrates
(D’Adderio, 2008a).
This point has been raised in recent studies in the Sociology of Finance. In
his studies of the market for financial derivatives, MacKenzie (2003, 2005,
and 2006) proposes a fine-grained identification of different categories of
performativity (influence of models on reality): ‘generic performativity’, when
an aspect of economics (a theory, model, concept, procedure, data-set, etc.) is
simply used by participants in economic processes; ‘effective performativity’,
when the practical use of an aspect of economics has an effect on economic
processes; ‘Barnesian performativity’, when the practical use of an aspect of
economics makes economic processes more like their depiction by economics;
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Figure 3. Procedures, rules and models: degrees of influence
Source: D’Adderio (2008).
and ‘counter-performativity’ when the practical use of an aspect of economics
makes economic processes less like their depiction by economics.
MacKenzie’s framework is especially useful in highlighting howwhat previous
theories considered the norm, are in fact often exceptions (Figure 3). At
one extreme of performativity, there is prescription, which represents a very
strong instance of performativity: automatic reproduction, pure repetition,
no more recalcitrance, recurrent events (Sahlins, 1985 in Callon, 2007). Full
prescription thus corresponds to ‘fiat lux et lux fuit’, as in the case of an
automatically reproduced sequence of computer algorithms. At this extreme,
which corresponds to the ‘framing view’ in Performativity Theory, there is very
little adaptation as models are automatically reproduced. At the other extreme,
there is the full demise or disuse of a model or tool, corresponding to the
‘overflowing view’ in Performativity Theory: the influence of the model is so
weak that it is disused or rejected, and therefore not enacted in practice. One way
to explain the demise of a tool or procedure, of course, is that individual agents
have made the conscious choice to reject the model. Performativity, however,
while not denying this possibility, affords us a more interesting explanation: the
model as statement has not been able to put into motion a world in which it can
function. In other words, the statement or formula has not been able to produce
a successful socio-technical agencement.
A socio-technical agencement is the assemblage of heterogeneous elements
that is required for the world contained in the statement to be actualized: ‘A
formula that progressively discovers its world and a world that is put into
motion by the formula describing it’ (MacKenzie, 2003 in Callon, 2007: 19).
According to this notion, a model as statement fails when it has not been able
to put into motion a world in which it can function, or, in other words, it
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has not been able to produce a successful socio-technical agencement. In the
struggle between competitive performative programmes, some agencies are able
to inscribe their own worldviews in artifacts (i.e. SOPs, rules). These agencies
are the most likely to succeed in exerting their own influence: enrolling artifacts
tends to create stronger agencements that, being tightly interconnected into a
web of organizational relationships, are more stable and therefore more difficult
to oppose or dismiss. The power of a SOPs or rules, thus, can be theorized as the
emergent outcome of struggles among the world that it manages to create and
other competing agencements. Some agencements are more, and some less, able
to enrol people and materials and therefore are more or less successful. Through
the notion of agencement, Performativity allows us to capture the influence
of models beyond extremes: while full prescription and mere description are
always possibilities, most of the time (and this is especially true in conditions of
uncertainty) there is performativity, implying some kind of dynamic adaptation
between model and reality (Callon, 2007).
MacKenzie’s nuanced classification of the influence of theories and models
of reality on reality itself is especially useful when translated to understand the
interactions between procedures, rules (models of routines), and performances
expressed in context (reality). Drawing from MacKenzie, this author has
thus proposed a framework that captures the influence of formal routines or
procedures (artifactual representations of routines) over routines in context
(performances). The resulting evidence demonstrates that each school of thought,
the mechanistic and the interpretivist, has placed itself at one of the extreme ends
of MacKenzie’s Performativity chart (Figure 2).
At one extreme of this debate (represented by the mechanistic school of
thought) is the view that procedures and rules completely prescribe or determine
actions. In interpreting the role of SOPs and rules as deterministic and equating
actors to rule-following automata, this view corresponds to the ‘framing’ side of
our performativity spectrum. This view constitutes an extreme given that, while
SOPs and rules frame actions and viewpoints to an extent, full prescription is a
rare and extreme outcome that entails automatic reproduction in the complete
absence of adaptation or resistance. At the other extreme, is the agency-centred
school that sees SOPs and rules as merely descriptive: simplified copies of the
actual process that they (mostly inadequately) attempt to mirror. This view,
centred on the ‘overflowing’ end of the Performativity framework, highlights the
interpretative role of human agents who, in enacting rules, are able to modify
or completely dismiss them (rules in this case are non-performative). While
this extreme is also possible, this view does not account for the fact that, by
incorporating beliefs into material devices, algorithms, procedures, and routines
a model can have an effect ‘even if those who use them are sceptical of the
model’s virtues, unaware of its details, or even ignorant of its very existence’
(MacKenzie, 2006: 19). While formal procedures and rules can always – at least
in theory – be worked around and dismissed, in practice they often play a role.
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Especially when embedded in artifacts or technologies such as software, they
become pervasive, difficult to change or avoid, and can be more easily enforced.
Thus, while possible in theory, mechanistic prescription and full interpretive
flexibility are in practice two extreme outcomes; to the extent that a rule or
procedure is entangled in a web of tools and organizational relationships, some
level of Performativity is likely to be at play. Artifact-embedded SOPS and rules
thus ‘do not simply describe, do not often prescribe, mostly they are performed’
(D’Adderio, 2008a: 784).
A further important implication of adopting a Performative approach is that
representations, models, are not simply a description of something resting outside
the market (reality), but constituent parts of it. In other words, they do not simply
represent, they have an effect on the reality in which they are embedded (Geertz,
1966; Pickering, 1994; Ferraro et al., 2005; Holm, 2007; D’Adderio, 2008a).
They are not just passive ‘guiding principles’, setting the boundaries of what
can be done and what cannot be done, as scholars have argued so far, but
they contribute to shaping actual processes. Similarly, in D’Adderio (2008a),
procedures – as artifactual representations of routines – do not rest outside
the routine as implied by contributions so far, but are important constituent
parts of it (Figures 1 and 4c). This observation holds potential for further
studies that capture the emergence of routines through the mutual shaping of
artifacts and performances. Whilst this move is fully in accordance with Cohen
et al.’s (1996) focus on the interactions between procedures and performances,
Performativity provides the theoretical tools and framework to characterize their
mutual influence.
Artifacts at the centre of routines: co-evolution of artifacts, procedures, and
performances through performative struggles
I propose that recent advances in Performativity Theory, as informed by both
the Pragmatist turn (Schatzki et al., 2001; Callon, 2007) and the Distributed
Cognition turn (Hutchins, 1995; Callon and Muniesa, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006)
in Actor Network Theory,5 and as recently imported into Routines Theory
(D’Adderio, 2008a, b), can provide novel and valuable insights into the role
of artifacts in routines evolution. In particular, the new approach can provide
the key to unlock the dynamics of interaction and mutual shaping between
formal procedures (routines-as-artifacts) and actual performances (routines-in-
practice). In order to achieve this goal, however, we need to go one final step
further to account fully for the role of artifacts and materiality in routines.6
5 Actor Network Theory is, perhaps counter-intuitively, not at all a theory but a framework to
understand and characterize the complex relationships between actors and artefacts/technologies, or
in Latour’s words, a mechanism for describing and accounting for everyday living (2005).
6 Materiality is understood here as ‘having material implications’. In other words, artefacts and devices
do things, no matter whether they are physical objects, or cognitive/conceptual devices: they havematerial
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A first observation is that artifacts do not simply provide information, they
construct information and they classify it according to specific worldviews that
belong to the agencies that have created or used them (Bowker and Star, 1999).
In other words, artifacts embody the ways in which specific agencies understand
and organize their world (D’Adderio, 2001, 2003). The fact that certain
agencies are more successful at this task than others, leads to asymmetric power
distribution among agencies and their performative programmes (Callon and
Muniesa, 2005). According to Callon (1998), the more successful performative
programmes are those that manage to enrol an array of materials and tools to
create a world in which they can function. Within these performative struggles
among competing agencies, artifacts thus play a key role.
An example of this is Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of the real estate market where
the encounter between the seller and the potential buyer becomes a tug of war in
which the former tries to impose his or her own calculative tools on the latter –
often with success (Bourdieu, 2005). In these encounters, ‘whether it is the
consumer hesitating between two packets of smoked ham or a couple anxiously
following the real estate agent’s calculations to assess their debt capacity, radi-
cally different values are confronted. When a compromise is reached, it has to be
interpreted as a compromise not on values but on the instruments that calculate
values’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2005: 1239). Similarly, this author (2008a) has
shown how Programme Management and Manufacturing functions at a vehicle
manufacturer manage to enrol the software, and software-embedded SOPs, and
thus to impose (at least partially) the culture, goals, and priorities that belong
to their occupational communities, including their idiosyncratic ‘languages’ and
worldviews (Dougherty, 1992; Galison, 1999; D’Adderio, 2001, 2003; Carlile,
2004). These examples demonstrate that, while a Performative approach brings
artifacts to the centre of attention in Routines Theory, it does not do so at
the expense of agency. Rather, it provides a means to capture the reciprocal
influence of agency and artifacts. This is where the above-mentioned notion of
‘inscription’ becomes especially useful: once we accept that artifacts in general,
and artifactual representations of routines in particular, as inscriptions, are not
neutral, there are important implications for routines and routine-following.
In the examples above, agencies are able to use artifacts to impose their own
classification and ordering of data, and process and decide what is and what is
not important, what should be allowed or disallowed. Agencies thus can enrol
arrays of artifacts and tools to help strengthen their performative programme.
Artifacts, in the case of routines, can include procedures as well as a wide range of
objects, tools, and technologies that can be harnessed to actualize their course or
‘make them happen’. As argued earlier, technologies and tools can help stabilize
statements and classifications, thus giving them solidity – just like the uploading
implications both for cognition and action (Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001; Leonardi and Barley, 2008;
Orlikowski, 2010) as well as being liable to material constraints (MacKenzie, 2009).
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of the Virtual Prototype and the Engineering Parts List in software (in D’Adderio,
2001, 2003 respectively) and the tracing of price variation curves in Preda (2007).
In these examples, software-embedded SOPs and rules, as inscriptions, ‘impose
a principle of reality; they constitute an obligatory point of passage, a perfectly
material reality to take into account . . . They are articulated to socio-technical
agencements that produce the traces that they use to inscribe the world in which
they are participants and on which they will, in turn, make possible to act’
(pp. 39–40).
While the above evidence could still be interpreted as a mere clash between
conflicting interests, there is, however, more to it. To paraphrase Callon (2007),
the various organizational actors attempt to construct the world (or socio-
technical agencement) they believe to resemble their own assumptions, views,
and aims. To do so, they enrol a number of artifacts and tools to strengthen
their influence. Confrontation therefore takes place not simply between different
agencies but between different worlds that are struggling to exist, one at the
expense of the other. The result of these struggles is that often none of the actors
is able to take their programme to its conclusion, since often no one function
is able to exclusively frame the process, as in the ‘engineering freeze’ example
(D’Adderio, 2008a). Here Programme Management, IT, and Manufacturing
partially succeeded in disciplining actions according to the software freeze rule –
therefore enforcing the deadline – and yet the Engineering function retained
some of their discretion to make substantial and late alterations. In the end,
the evidence showed that each agency had to compromise and at least partially
accept the other’s programme, meaning that only portions of their world were
realized. The world that ended up existing was thus, as in Callon’s discussion
(2007), a compromise, a patchwork containing elements from competing worlds.
An important implication of acknowledging the struggles among competitive
performative programmes is that this lens can be used to uncover the dynamics of
convergence and divergence between routines’ constituent parts or aspects, such
as procedures and performances. In D’Adderio (2008a, b), evidence drawn from
the ethnographic observation of the mutual influence between SOPs as artifactual
representations and actual performances, showed how rules and SOPs contain
abstracted, filtered, and reconfigured traces of actors’ knowledge and intent and
therefore provide a strong example of distributed cognition in the Hutchins sense
(MacKenzie, 2006; D’Adderio, 2008a). Thus, by focusing on SOPs, this author
was able to show how performative struggles influence the direction of their
interactions, i.e. performativity vs. counter-performativity), the intensity of these
interactions (i.e. weak vs. strong performativity), and, ultimately, the persistence
of the routinized pattern or deviation from its course (depending upon which
programme – or configuration of programmes – manages to prevail).
The above considerations led to important conclusions, namely that, in order
to understand routines evolution, we need to study how artifacts – and artifactual
representations – themselves evolve. From the above discussion, it emerges
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that artifacts have a history which reflects the performative struggles in which
they have been involved and from which they have emerged and evolve. In
D’Adderio (2008b), we see how the computer model, containing SOPs, evolves
as a consequence of being incorporated in the struggles among different agencies
that want to prevail. The artifact, as a result, comes to reflect the stratification of
different (and possibly contrasting) organizational logics or rationales. Focusing
on artifacts, and their evolution, thus can provide us with important new insights
into routines and wider organizational dynamics.
6. Conclusions: the artifactual turn in Routines Theory
In this paper, I have argued for a radical framework shift that brings artifacts
and materiality to the centre of routines and Routines Theory. This approach
involved four steps. The first step entailed bringing artifacts to the fore by
asserting the key role that they play as mediators in human cognition and
activity. The fact that action and cognition are distributed, meaning that they
are not simply divided between but stretched across people and artifacts,
calls for a deeper understanding of the role of artifacts in rule- and routine-
following. I have thus introduced the notion of ‘distributed agency’ to better
account for the combined influence of human and non-humans on routines.
The second step involved shifting the focus further away from agency as a
property that belongs solely to humans by discussing how actors’ assumptions
and intentions can become embedded in artifacts. Through applying the STS
notion of ‘inscription’ to artifacts, in general, and ‘artifactual representations’
of routines (i.e. formal rules, procedures, SOPs), in particular, I have shown
how these are not neutral but selective arrangements of scripts that reflect the
agencies that are involved in their production and use. I have thus discussed some
implications for routinized performances. The fact that particular configurations
of assumptions and intentions are embedded in procedures holds fundamental
consequences for routines (re)production, as in the case of routines transfer and
the diffusion of ‘best’ practices. The third step involved characterizing the ways
in which artifacts, including artifactual representations, influence performances.
This entailed moving beyond the extant view of artifacts as passively ‘guiding’
and ‘constraining’, to viewing them as entities that can actively shape the course
of routines. I have thus introduced the notions of ‘affordance’ and ‘power of
default’ to indicate how, while artifact-embedded rules are rarely deterministic,
humans do not always choose to bypass the artifact, but often blindly follow their
invitation to act in a particular way. The fourth and final step involved harnessing
the Performative approach, developed in Economic Sociology and the Sociology
of Finance (Callon, 1998, 2007; MacKenzie, 2006) to support the material and
artifactual turn in Routines Theory. This entailed discussing how artifacts and
routines co-evolve through their involvement in ‘performative struggles’ among
competing organizational agencies. This move was made possible by adopting a
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novel characterization of routinized performances as the result of understandings
and actions by ‘hybrid collectives’, involving (temporarily stable) configurations
of humans and artifacts. Here we have seen how the calculative powers of
agencies – for example their ability to influence the course of a routine – are
closely linked to the equipment they can access. Therefore, artifacts can make a
difference in terms of whether a procedure is followed, the extent to which it is
followed, or whether it is rejected altogether.
Performing the artifactual shift in Routines was made possible by adopting
new conceptual tools that capture the micro dynamics of interaction among
routines, agencies, and artifacts. I have thus suggested that recent advances
in Routines and Performativity Theory can help advance our understanding
of the role and influence of artifactual representations of routines, including
SOPs and formal routines and rules (Cohen et al., 1996). In affording an
advanced characterization of artifactual representations as models of routines,
the Performative approach can allow us to capture the deeper dynamics of
interactions between different aspects of routines. This approach allows us
to add to both the representations/expressions and the ostensive/performative
frameworks which it synthesizes (figure 4a, b, c), thus contributing to further
our understanding of routines as dynamic and generative systems.
In the first case, the new approach allowed us to capture with clarity and
precision the co-evolution of ‘representations’ and ‘expressions’, including their
interactions which were left unexplored in Cohen et al.’s (1996) pioneering
paper. By moving past a reductive characterization of representations as intrin-
sically imperfect and biased copies of ‘real’ routines, we are able to see them as
entities that play a fundamental role in routines’ evolution, and which therefore
deserve to be studied in their own right. In the second case, the framework
allowed us to add to the extant characterization of artifacts as ‘proxies’ of the
ostensive aspect, by demonstrating the usefulness of viewing them as entities
containing selective instantiations or configurations of ostensive views.7 This, in
turn, allowed us to theorise, in detail, the dynamic relationship between, on the
one hand, ostensive aspects of routines and artifacts, and, on the other, artifacts
and performative aspects. Focusing on the relationship between artifacts and
ostensive, we were able to capture the micro dynamics by which specific ostensive
views are selected and become embedded into artifactual representations of
routines (i.e. rules and procedures), and, by focusing on the relationships between
artifacts and performative, we were able to capture the micro dynamics by which
artifacts influence (and are influenced by) performances.
7 The expression ‘selective instantiation’ or ‘selective configuration’ is better suited to our approach
than the notion of ‘proxy’, which might be interpreted as implying a negative view of artifacts (as
flawed imitations) when compared to actual routines. Through ANT we can characterize an artifactual
representation as one of the multiple possible expressions or codifications that an actual routine can
assume (on multiplicity see Mol, 2002).
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Figure 4. Artifacts from the periphery to the centre of routines
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The advances brought by the new focus on artifacts, in the second case,
add further to the Routines debate by grounding or ‘situating the ostensive’
and allowing for a much finer-grained analysis than has been possible so
far. We have seen how, for example, by being relatively visible and stable,
artifactual representations can provide vantage points to observe routines
dynamics, as in the earlier mentioned example of the software-embedded
standard operating procedure. This theoretical device thus could open up the
way for an entire population of studies focusing on the relationship between
ostensive and performative seen through the lens of artifacts (see Figure 4c). In
affording new ways to explore the relationship between artifacts/ostensive and
artifacts/performative, these studies can provide further evidence to support the
artifactual shift in Routines Theory.
I have also suggested that considering the evolution of the artifacts
themselves – as important entities in their own right – is valuable as it can
shed light over the ways in which artifact-embedded agentic programmes can
shape ‘live’ routines. New insights can thus be achieved by focusing on the
process of delegation of intentions by human actors to non-humans. The careful
analysis of the process of inscription thus can reveal the hybrid configura-
tions – or layers – of assumptions and physical elements through which artifacts
are constituted and reconstituted. This approach calls for a situated (Suchman,
1987; Lave, 1988; Lave and Wenger, 1991), almost ‘archeological’ approach
to studying routines and their artifacts, one that entails focusing not simply
on the routine itself but also on the interlinked artifacts that contribute to its
performances, and to how such artifacts come to be. From this vantage point,
we can also analyse how artifacts themselves evolve as a consequence of their
participation in performative programmes and the struggles among competing
organizational agencies. This involves uncovering the assumptions and views that
Artifacts at the centre of routines 225
artifacts come to embody as a consequence of these struggles, which influence
routines dramatically while giving life to new ‘truces’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Zbarachi and Bergen, forthcoming). An interesting issue for future scholarly
enquiry would thus be to explain the persistence of artifact-embedded meanings
and assumptions, and how they change over time as people leave the organization
and artifacts are appropriated by different groups for different ends.
The latter aspect is also important for practitioners, both those involved in the
design of such artifacts, and those involved in their implementation/adoption.
An important implication of our theory for designers and managers is that,
while there is no doubt that it is not sufficient to design SOPs in the hope that
performances will follow, as Pentland and Feldman have convincingly argued
(2008), at the same time the specific classifications and rationales embedded in
the design of SOPs can – and often do – bear an influence on the context where
they are used or adopted. This observation calls for the need to uncover the
ways in which the assumptions and rationales embedded in standard practices,
procedures, and rules in the course of their creation, transfer, and adoption
stages may clash with or complement the assumptions and rationales in the
context where the procedure or rule is adopted. The implication here is that
the assumptions and rationales embedded in procedures at design stage are
likely to influence the fit between the imported ‘best’ practice and the different
implementation locales in which it is adopted. The framework presented here,
therefore, provides the tools to begin to unravel complex transfer dynamics.
In conclusion, this position paper constitutes a first systematic attempt to
compensate for the lack of attention in Routines Theory towards the key role
of artifacts and technologies and their influence on routines evolution. Through
a series of examples I have thus shown that, in order to realize the material
and artifactual turn in Routines Theory, and advance our understanding of
routines dynamics beyond the current state of the art, we need to analyse the
interactions between artifacts and aspects of routines in depth and detail. This
involves analysing the deeper interactions between artifacts and ostensive, on
the one hand (i.e. which ostensive views are selected, retained, and replicated
and how), and artifacts and performative (i.e. the convergence and divergence
between artifactual representations/routines-in-theory, and expressions/routines-
in-practice), on the other. The artifactual focus proposed here is also important
in channelling our attention towards the influence on routine of heterogeneous
motivations by agencies whose specific knowledge, aims, and objectives can be
complementary or competing. Focusing on artifacts, in this sense, does not mean
losing sight of agency, but rather it implies acknowledging that the influence of
agency is mediated – and partially shaped – by artifacts. This holds important
implications for routines.
Acknowledging the central role and influence of artifacts and distributed
agencies in routines can thus afford an entirely new perspective over
key outstanding organizational issues including the micro dynamics that
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underpin organizational stability and change. For example, how do routines
and capabilities emerge? How are heterogeneous configurations of artifacts
and agencies stabilized in recurrent but perpetually challenged patterns of
interaction? What is the influence of artifacts and distributed agencies over the
dynamics by which routines and capabilities are created and recreated, codified,
transferred, replicated, and maintained? And what is their influence over the
organizational ability to dynamically renew and reconfigure its routines and
capabilities in order to adapt to change and to innovate? In providing a novel
characterization of routines and capabilities micro dynamics, this paper can
open up new and promising avenues for future scholarly enquiry. Through its
nuanced and dynamic characterization of the relationship between routines,
agencies, and artifacts, this work lays out the foundations for a second, ‘small
Copernican revolution’ in Routines Theory, one that brings artifacts in general,
and artifactual representations of routines in particular, from the periphery to
the very centre of routines.
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